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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LIMITING THE WAYS TO SKIN A CAT—AN END
TO THE 20 YEAR PERPLEXITY OF THE CAT’S PAW THEORY IN
STAUB V. PROCTOR?

INTRODUCTION
In 1931, during the midst of the Great Depression, Henry Ford remarked
that the economic crisis has fallen on this country because “the average man
won’t really do a day’s work unless he is caught and cannot get out of it.
There is plenty of work to do if people would do it.”1 “A few weeks later he
laid off 75,000 workers.”2 Of course, this quote should not be interpreted to
mean that all adverse employment decisions are the result of a deceitful and
fickle employer. This would be a clear overgeneralization of psyche of the
average American employer. After all, an employer’s choice to hire or fire one
person over another cannot be easy. The decision likely takes food off of an
employee’s table and a roof from over his or her head.
What it does suggest, however, is that there is definite need to inquire
further into the motives of an employer. Layoffs, pay-cuts, and reductions in
hours are often the unfortunate side-effects of an unpredictable and fear-driven
economy like the current one in this country, but overlooked in this madness
are the underlying motives behind an employer’s decision. While most would
like to think that an employer’s decisions are made with the purest of
intentions, statistics might show otherwise.3 In 2009, for example, an
astounding 93,277 workplace discrimination charges were filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter “EEOC”), the secondhighest total in history, second only to the all-time record of 95,402 charges
These statistics are not necessarily proof that
established in 2008.4
discrimination occurred in each and every case, but they could be evidence that
more workers are beginning to question the motivation behind adverse
employment decisions.
While employers like Henry Ford were surely making decisions without
much consultation, the same is not true of decisionmakers in the American
1. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492–PRESENT 387
(2003).
2. Id.
3. See e.g., Enforcement & Litigation Statistics All Statutes FY 1997 - FY 2011, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
all.cfm (last visited May 20, 2012).
4. Id.
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workplace today. Multiple levels of supervisors and managers regularly have
some input in company decisions. With layoffs, for example, although most
day-to-day employee/employer interactions take place on a personal level with
intermediate supervisors, the decision to terminate an employee may be made
by a supervisor higher up in the corporate chain that has had little or no
interaction with the terminated employee.5 Employers believe that objectivity
is firmly entrenched in the decisionmaking process because seemingly
independent and neutral decisionmakers higher in the company ladder are
individually pulling the strings.6 However, a unique theory of employer
liability has emerged in the context of this modern decisionmaking process.
Employers may find themselves liable when an intermediate supervisor with
biased intentions influences the final decisionmaker.7
Adversely effected employees have begun to sue their employers under
this special theory of liability.8 Even though the final decisionmaker had no
discriminatory motive, the employer may nonetheless be liable if the biased
supervisor’s input was relied upon in making the adverse employment
decision.9 In the Seventh Circuit case, Shager v. Upjohn Co., Judge Richard
Posner famously analogized this influenced-based liability theory to a
Seventeenth century fable.10 The fable goes:
A Monkey and a Cat lived in the same family, and it was hard to tell which
was the greater thief.
One day, as they were roaming together, they spied some chestnuts
roasting in the ashes of a fire.
“Come,” said the cunning Monkey, “we shall not go dinnerless to-day.
Your claws are better than mine for the purpose; pull the chestnuts out of the
ashes, and you shall have half.”
Puss pulled them out, burning her paws very much in doing so. When she
had stolen every one, she turned to the Monkey for her share of the booty; but,
to her chagrin, she found no chestnuts, for he had eaten them all.
11

A thief cannot be trusted even by another thief.

Posner cleverly correlated the fable to the underlying principles of the liability
theory and coined what is now known as the “cat’s paw” theory of liability.12

5. Holli Hartman, Thinking Beyond ‘You’re Fired!,’ COLORADOBIZ MAG., Aug. 2005, at
13.
6. See, e.g., Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1999).
7. Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
8. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir. 2006).
9. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405.
10. Id.
11. A CHILD’S VERSION OF AESOP’S FABLES 107–08 (J.H. Stickney ed., Boston, U.S., Ginn
& Co., 1891).
12. Shager, 913 F.2d at 405.
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The employer faces liability where the ultimate decisionmaker, the Cat, is
unknowingly being influenced by the biased supervisor, or manipulative
Monkey.
The cat’s paw theory could hypothetically be applied to any cause of
action that involves a question of intent. Theoretically, it could very well be
applied to any intentional tort claim where the actions of a party are caused by
motives of another. Yet, the legal application of this theory has been almost
completely segregated to the employment law context. The theory has been
widely used over the past twenty years under a variety of federal
These statutes prohibit employers from
antidiscrimination statutes.13
discriminating against an employee because of his or her status as a member of
a protected class. Specifically, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, has been the prominent statute used to challenge adverse employment
decisions under this theory.14 The cat’s paw liability theory has also been
applied to sexual harassment cases and to situations when employers have
retaliated against an employee for reporting a bias or another violation.15
Additionally, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (hereinafter
“ADEA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter
“ADA”), which protect employees from adverse employment decisions based
on age and qualifying disabilities respectively, have also been battlegrounds
for the cat’s paw theory.16 Finally, the Family Medical Leave Act (hereinafter
“FMLA”) and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (hereinafter “PDA”) have
also been stages for recent discrimination claims under the cat’s paw theory.17
Given that this theory is still in its infancy, there should be little surprise
that circuit courts of appeal have had difficulty agreeing upon a basic threshold
test for determining liability under the cat’s paw theory.18 While all federal
circuits adopted some form of cat’s paw liability, there was no uniformity, as
courts applied a vast spectrum of standards for establishing employer
liability.19 Specifically, the circuits disagreed as to how much influence the
biased supervisor should have over the decisionmaker in order to attribute the
bias of the supervisor upon the employer.20 Another matter of contention

13. See cases cited infra notes 14–17.
14. See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006).
15. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Colorado Dep’t. of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1059 (10th Cir. 2009).
16. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Walgreen Co., 615 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 2010); Dwyer v. Ethan
Allen Retail, Inc., 325 F. App’x 755, 757 (11th Cir. 2009).
17. See, e.g., Long v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 566 F. Supp. 2d 851, 860 (C.D. Ill. 2008), aff’d,
585 F.3d 344, 351 (7th Cir. 2009); Brown v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 1:07-CV-1118-DFH-DML,
2009 WL 995755 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 2009).
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part I.
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among the circuits was how much consideration to give employers who have
taken affirmative steps to rehabilitate the decisionmaking process by
conducting their own independent investigations.21 Similarly debated among
the circuits was whether an employee should be barred from asserting a cat’s
paw claim if he or she failed to raise the issue of bias when previously given an
opportunity.22
In order to settle the circuit split, in 2007, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the Tenth Circuit case, EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co.23
The case was fully briefed and set for oral arguments, but less than a week
before the oral arguments, BCI withdrew its appeal without an explanation and
subsequently settled the case with the EEOC.24 In the spring of 2010, at the
urging of the Obama administration, the Supreme Court once again granted
certiorari to a cat’s paw case, this time to the Seventh Circuit case, Staub v.
Proctor Hospital.25
The statutory context of Staub occurred within the confines of a special
antidiscrimination statute, the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (hereinafter “USERRA”).26 Under USERRA, no
limitations on an employee’s military leave of absence can be imposed beyond
those required by the law (advance notice, cumulative time-in-service limit,
and timely return to work).27 Even if an employer finds the time, duration,
frequency, or nature of an employee’s military service to be unreasonable, it
cannot deny the employee leave from work or refuse to reemploy the person.28
Staub was the case of a fired hospital worker who claimed he lost his job over
his service in the U.S. Army Reserve.29
Since the cat’s paw theory was being examined within the confines of
USERRA and not Title VII, some feared that the Supreme Court case may
limit the precedential impact of the decision. Ultimately, these fears were
eased when the Supreme Court suggested that the statutory similarities
between USERRA and Title VII made the Court’s holding in Staub applicable
to future cat’s paw cases examined under Title VII.30

21. See infra Part III.
22. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 293 (4th Cir. 2004)
(en banc).
23. 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007).
24. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. EEOC, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (dismissing the writ of
certiorari).
25. 560 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010).
26. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–34 (2006).
27. Id. § 4316.
28. Id.
29. 560 F.3d at 650–51.
30. 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
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Most anticipated that Staub would end the twenty year perplexity
surrounding the applicability of the cat’s paw theory. However, the Supreme
Court failed to provide much guidance to courts, and instead, created more
questions than answers. Left most bewildered by this decision are the modern
employers who face tremendous uncertainty in the wake of this landmark
decision. Staub has left employers with little protections against the
discriminatory animus of someone who may have played no role in the
decisionmaking process.
Part I of this note will examine the brief history of the cat’s paw theory.
Most notably, it will include an analysis into the theory’s recent emergence and
current place as a point of contention among the circuits. Part II of this note
will examine Staub and the cat’s paw liability issues surrounding the case.
Finally, Part III of this note will argue that the Supreme Court missed an
opportunity in Staub to adopt a balanced causation standard that would allow
modern employers to effectively maintain multi-layered decisionmaking
processes.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CAT’S PAW THEORY
A.

Origination of the Cat’s Paw Theory

As previously stated, the origin of the cat’s paw theory can be traced back
to the Seventh Circuit decision in the Shager v. Upjohn.31 Ralph Shager, a
fifty-three year-old salesperson, was fired by Upjohn Co.’s “Career Path
Committee” after his thirty-eight year old sales manager, John Lehnst,
recommended that he be terminated.32 Believing he was fired because of
Lehnst’s alleged animus against his age, Shager sued Upjohn Co. under the
ADEA claiming age discrimination.33
In his decision, Judge Posner recognized the inherent problem of imputing
liability on Upjohn Co. when the ADEA is “silent on the issue of derivative
liability.”34 Without direct statutory guidance, Posner analyzed the liability
question in terms of agency principles.35 First, he explained that a biased
supervisor acting as an agent of the employer could potentially subject the
employer to liability.36 Quite simply, had Lehnst fired Shager directly (without
the involvement of the Career Path Committee), Upjohn Co. would be liable
31. 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
32. Id. at 399–400.
33. Id. Although the Supreme Court recently held that claims filed under the ADEA require
“but for” causation, the cat’s paw theory is mainly based upon agency principles and is an issue
of derivative liability and therefore, the causation analysis should be entirely distinct. See Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
34. Shager, 913 F.2d at 404.
35. Id. at 404–05.
36. Id.
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on agency principles because he would have been acting within the scope of
his duties.37 On the flip side, however, Posner admitted:
Lehnst did not fire Shager; the Career Path Committee did. If it did so for
reasons untainted by any prejudice of Lehnst’s against older workers, the
causal link between that prejudice and Shager’s discharge is severed, and
Shager cannot maintain this suit . . . . But if Shager’s evidence is believed . . .
the committee’s decision to fire him was tainted by Lehnst’s prejudice. . . .
Lehnst was the district manager; he presented plausible evidence that one of
his sales representatives should be discharged; the committee was not
conversant with the possible age animus that may have motivated Lehnst’s
recommendation. If [the committee] acted as the conduit of Lehnst’s
prejudice—his cat’s paw—the innocence of its members would not spare the
38
company from liability.

Posner, by evaluating agency principles, gave birth to the cat’s paw theory
of liability. Since Lehnst had acted within the scope of his duties when he
made his recommendation to the committee, his animus against older workers
was imputed to the company because he had influenced the decisionmaker.39
Left unanswered by this decision, however, was how much influence a biased
subordinate would need to exert over the decisionmaker in order to spring
employer liability to life. In other words, an exact causation standard for
determining liability was absent from the court’s analysis.
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, some eight years after Shager,
the Supreme Court endorsed the concept of cat’s paw liability (also known as
subordinate bias liability), but it too failed to proscribe the proper standard for
determining causation.40 Roger Reeves sued his former employer, alleging
that he was terminated because of his age in violation of the ADEA.41 While
not expressly referencing the cat’s paw theory directly, the Court held that his
employer was not entitled to summary judgment because “[Reeves] introduced
additional evidence that [one of his superiors in the chain of authority] was
motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsible for [his]
The Court noted that Reeves’ supervisor “was the actual
firing.”42

37. Id. at 405.
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 404–05.
40. 530 U.S. 133, 140 (2000). Even though the Supreme Court never used the phrase ‘cat’s
paw,’ the Fourth Circuit has deemed that the Court’s language in Reeves should be the be-all and
end-all under the theory. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 288
(4th Cir. 2004).
41. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 138.
42. Id. at 151. Although the employee’s supervisor only recommended the petitioner’s
termination to the formal decisionmaker, the formal decisionmaker was the company president;
according to testimony from a supervisor in the company, the supervisor had essentially signed
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decisionmaker” and was “principally responsible” for his firing, but the Court
failed to describe what these terms meant.43 It seems as though the Court was
willing to embrace some form of cat’s paw liability, but to what extent?44
From Reeves, it is clear that when the biased supervisor is the actual
decisionmaker behind the adverse employment action, there may be liability
imputed to the employer.45 What is unclear from Reeves, however, is whether
there might be lower levels of subordinate liability causation that would impute
liability to the employer.
In Shager, Posner used the word “conduit” to describe the kind of causal
relationship between the biased the subordinate and the ultimate
decisionmaker.46 Circuit courts have had difficulty measuring what constitutes
this “conduit causation” in the cat’s paw theory. Further, since the Reeves
decision is largely silent on the issue of employer liability for a biased
subordinate, the circuit courts have been left to decipher the causation question
themselves. Without guidance for determining the proper causation standard,
circuit courts have diverged widely in their causation standards.
B.

The Circuit Split

Each circuit has adopted its own approach to decipher the causation
question. For illustrative purposes, the standards can appropriately be
described as lying on a causation spectrum. On one end of the causation
spectrum is the Fourth Circuit’s strict “actual decisionmaker” approach.47 At
the other end of the causation spectrum is the “tainted decision” approach
developed by a number of circuits.48 Before discussing the standard that the
Supreme Court developed in Staub, it is first necessary to explain how these
two causation approaches differ so substantially.
1. The Fourth Circuit’s “Actual Decisionmaker” Approach
The Fourth Circuit case, Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, is
the prominent example of a strict causation approach.49 With this decision, the

Reeves’ pink slip because employees feared the supervisor, and he had exercised absolute power
with the company. Id. at 152.
43. Id. at 151, 152.
44. See id. at 151–54.
45. See id. at 153–54.
46. 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). Although is it not as prominent as the term “cat’s
paw”, some courts have chosen to refer to the theory as “conduit” theory. Other metaphoric
descriptions of the cat’s paw theory include “rubber-stamp” and “vehicle,” or quite simply,
subordinate bias liability theory. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th
Cir. 2006).
47. See infra Part II.B.1.
48. See infra Part II.B.2.
49. 354 F.3d, 277, 288 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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Fourth Circuit became an extreme outlier among circuits. Drawing directly
from the Supreme Court’s limited language in Reeves, the Fourth Circuit
requires that the biased subordinate be “principally responsible” for the
adverse employment decision.50 The Hill court strictly interpreted the Reeves
decision and stated that an employer will only be found liable under the cat’s
paw theory if the subordinate were the “actual decisionmaker” behind the
adverse employment action.51 The Fourth Circuit denounced any broader
interpretation of conduit causation and dealt a serious blow to the future of
cat’s paw claims.52
Louise Hill, an aircraft mechanic at a military base, claimed that her
supervisor, Ed Fultz, held a discriminatory animus against her because of both
her age and gender.53 While she was employed at Lockheed, Fultz had
referred to Hill as a “damn woman” and a “useless old lady.”54 After Hill had
received several written reprimands, Lockheed fired her.55 She subsequently
brought suit against Lockheed under Title VII and the ADEA, and also claimed
retaliation.56 After giving special attention to the concepts of agency law in
several Supreme Court cases, the Fourth Circuit swiftly dismissed any
application of a lenient causation standard.57 The Fourth Circuit claimed that
other courts had failed to accurately apply the cat’s paw theory because their
interpretations did not comply with Posner’s original application of agency law
under the theory.58
Perhaps the most outlandish stance by the Fourth Circuit was its stance on
“supervisory or disciplinary authority.”59 Without such authority in the hands
of the biased subordinate, the court held that the cat’s paw theory is
inappropriate.60 It stated:
[W]e decline to endorse a construction of the discrimination statutes that
would allow a biased subordinate who has no supervisory or disciplinary
authority and who does not make the final or formal employment decision to
become a decisionmaker simply because he had a substantial influence on the
ultimate decision or because he has played a role, even a significant one, in the
61
adverse employment decision.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 290.
Id.
See id. at 291.
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 283.
Hill, 354 F.3d at 283.
Id. at 281.
See id. at 290–91.
See id. at 289–90.
Id. at 291.
See id. at 291.
Hill, 354 F.3d at 291.
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Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, the subordinate must be the actual
decisionmaker of the adverse employment action and possess some kind of
supervisory or disciplinary authority.62 It seems an employer would be
immune from liability in situations where the biased subordinate was merely a
co-worker or subordinate of the terminated employee.
In a dissent joined by three other judges, Judge Michael fired back at the
majority’s stance.63 He stated that the majority’s position “puts [the Fourth
Circuit] at odds with virtually every other circuit, and it puts [the Fourth
Circuit] at odds with the language of the statutes, which impose liability when
an adverse employment decision is taken ‘because of’ sex or age
discrimination.”64 The four dissenters supported the adoption of a more lenient
causation standard, one where subordinate bias could be imputed to the
decisionmaker where the biased subordinate simply has “substantial influence”
on the employment decision.65
The Fourth Circuit’s uncompromising adherence to some select language
of the Reeves decision led to the adoption of this harsh causation standard.66
Other than the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Staub, the Fourth Circuit is the
only circuit to incorporate the actual decisionmaker causation standard.67
Other circuits interpret the “conduit” language of Shager more loosely.
2. The “Tainted Decision” Approach
The “tainted decision” approach is certainly the most plaintiff-friendly
standard among the circuits. In contrast to most other circuits where the
plaintiff needs to show that the biased subordinate had infected the
decisionmakers,68 in the circuits that have adopted a form of the “tainted
decision” approach, an employer could face liability under the cat’s paw theory

62. See id. While it seems that this high bar would limit cat’s paw cases in the Fourth
Circuit, there have been some plaintiffs who have met it. See Schafer v. Md. Dep’t of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 359 F. App’x 385, 389 (4th Cir. 2009). The court ruled that the requirement
was met when testimony had established the biased subordinate had a significant degree of
supervision over the formal decisionmaker. Id.
63. Hill, 354 F.3d at 299 (Michael, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (citation omitted). Other circuits have described the Fourth Circuit’s stance on cat’s
paw liability as “inconsistent with the normal analysis of causal issues in tort litigation.” Lust v.
Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1182
(9th Cir. 2007).
65. Hill, 354 F.3d at 304 (Michael, J., dissenting) (finding the “substantial influence”
standard would be an example of a more balanced causation standard).
66. See id.
67. As discussed infra in Part II of this comment, the Seventh Circuit uses the causation
standard of “singular influence.” Although the Seventh Circuit does not use the words “actual
decisionmaker,” the two causation standards are extremely similar to one another; thus, both the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits were notoriously on the strict side of the causation spectrum.
68. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 485 (10th Cir. 2006).
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if the overall decisionmaking process itself was tainted by a biased
subordinate.69 This subtle but importance difference is best illustrated by the
First Circuit case, Cariglia v. Hertz Equipment Rental Corp.70
John Cariglia, an employee of Hertz, brought an age discrimination claim
against Hertz when he was terminated after many years of service.71 Cariglia’s
supervisor, James Heard, had allegedly misinformed Hertz executives about
Cariglia’s performance.72 Witnesses stated that Heard denigrated Cariglia, and
the district court found Heard had “made statements rife with discriminatory
animus,” specifically that Cariglia was “over the hill,” “not our kind,” and that
he “should not be here.”73 However, the district court found Hertz not liable
because there was no evidence that the Hertz executives, the actual
decisionmakers, had been influenced by Heard’s bias.74 The First Circuit
vacated the decision because the district court had improperly focused on
whether the Hertz executives, the decisionmakers, were improperly
influenced.75 Instead, the First Circuit reasoned that the causation question
should be analyzed in terms of whether the decision process itself had been
tainted.76
The First, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits have also adopted some form of the
“tainted decision” approach. 77 These circuits have held that an employer
liability could be imputed even if the decisionmaker is entirely unbiased.78 For
example the D.C. Circuit has stated:
When a [biased subordinate] . . . deliberately places an inaccurate,
discriminatory evaluation into an employee’s file, he intends to cause harm to
the employee. . . . [T]he employer—that is, the organization as a whole—
cannot escape . . . liability simply because the final decisionmaker was not
79
personally motivated by discrimination.

69. See Cariglia v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 363 F.3d 77, 85–86 (1st Cir. 2004).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 79.
72. See id. at 82.
73. Id. at 80.
74. Id. at 84–85.
75. See Cariglia, 363 F.3d at 88–89.
76. Id. at 88.
77. See id. at 87; Stoller v. Marsh, 682 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333
F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2003).
78. See, e.g., Cariglia, 363 F.3d at 87–88. Theoretically, a manipulative subordinate may
not even need to outwardly express his bias; if he merely gave one poor performance evaluation
because he inwardly harbored some prejudice, then this might be enough to impute liability to the
employer.
79. Stoller, 682 F.2d at 977 (citation omitted).
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The Fifth Circuit has similarly held that “the discriminatory animus of a
manager can be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker if the [manager] . . . had
influence or leverage over” the decisionmaking.80
3. The Middle of the Causation Spectrum
The causation standards adopted by a majority of the circuits fit
somewhere between the extremes of the “actual decisionmaker” approach and
the “tainted decision” approach. In EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., the
Tenth Circuit fashioned perhaps the greatest argument for adopting a balanced
causation approach.81 In BCI, the EEOC brought suit against BCI under Title
VII.82 The EEOC claimed that Stephen Peters had been discharged because of
his race.83 Peters’ immediate supervisor, Cesar Grado, allegedly held a
discriminatory animus against Peters because he was African American.84 The
district court found for BCI under the cat’s paw theory because the decision to
terminate Peters was made by a manager who did not even know that Peters
was African American.85
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court because it
found that the manager had exclusively relied on the biased recommendations
of Grado.86 In its analysis, the court disagreed with the extremely arduous
causation standards developed by other circuits.87 The court first dismissed
what it felt were too lenient causation standards developed by other circuits.88
The court stated:
This [lenient] standard apparently contemplates that any “influence,” the
reporting of any “factual information,” or any form of “other input” by a
biased subordinate renders the employer liable so long as the subordinate “may
have affected” the employment action. Such a weak relationship between the
subordinate’s actions and the ultimate employment decision improperly
89
eliminates a requirement of causation.

Although the court exaggerated the leniency of the causation standards in
other circuits, its desire to eliminate hypothetical reasoning is well-founded.90

80. Laxton, 333 F.3d at 584.
81. 450 F.3d 476, 483–89 (10th Cir. 2006).
82. Id. at 482.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 483.
86. Id. at 493.
87. BCI, 450 F.3d at 485–88.
88. Id. at 486–87.
89. Id.
90. See id. The Tenth Circuit criticized a pre-Staub Seventh Circuit cat’s paw case for
adopting a less rigorous causation standard. Id. However, the court mischaracterized the
standard articulated by the Seventh Circuit. The use of the phrase “may have affected” was not
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Causation should not be viewed in terms of what may have happened. A
determination of what did occur should be the only relevant question. The
Tenth Circuit also quickly rejected the “actual decisionmaker” approach
developed by the Fourth Circuit.91 The court explained:
The Fourth Circuit’s strict approach makes too much of the phrase “actual
decisionmaker” . . . . The Fourth Circuit’s peculiar focus on “who is a
‘decisionmaker’ for purposes of discrimination actions,” seems misplaced.
The word “decisionmaker” appears nowhere in Title VII. Instead, the statute
imposes liability for discrimination by employers and their agents, which in
accordance with agency law principles includes not only “decisionmakers” but
92
other agents whose actions, aided by the agency relation, cause injury.

The court’s analysis epitomizes the predicament that has developed due to
the disparity across the circuits.93 As a midpoint solution, the Tenth Circuit
panel held that a plaintiff must establish more than mere influence and more
than mere input in the decisionmaking process to satisfy the element of
The issue should be whether the biased subordinate’s
causation.94
discriminatory reports, recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse
employment action.95 The court maintained that the causation standard should
be aligned with the agency law principles that animate the statutory definition
of an employer.96
The court also noted the importance of the employer’s independent
investigation.97 Since a plaintiff has to demonstrate that the actions of the
biased subordinate caused the employment action, an employer can avoid
liability by conducting an independent investigation of the allegations against
an employee.98 By independently investigating employee records and job
performance, the decisionmaker is able to form his own opinions and cleanse

presented as a substantive standard; instead, the phrase was used as a procedural benchmark (to
highlight when a cat’s paw claim should survive summary judgment proceedings). See Dey v.
Colt Const. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994).
91. BCI, 450 F.3d at 487.
92. Id. (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 485–87. The circuit courts have simply no guidance to delineate the proper
causation standard. Each circuit tries to fashion the proper standard for this broadly applicable
theory by examining it under just one specific factual scenario and under one specific antidiscrimination statute.
94. Id. at 487.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. BCI, 450 F.3d at 488. It may be easy to think of an independent investigation like the
recoil of loaded spring. The employer may bounce back from a showing of improper
manipulation by showing that decisionmaking process was indeed accurate even despite the
presence of bias.
98. Id.
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himself of the biased subordinate’s influence.99 An independent investigation
by the decisionmaker may not need to be extensive.100 The court mentioned
that simply asking an employee for his version of events may defeat the
inference that an employment decision was discriminatory.101
The Tenth Circuit’s causation standard in BCI is indicative of most other
circuits that lie in the middle of the spectrum. That is, these circuits hold that
the biased subordinate need not be the actual decisionmaker, but still, a
definitive causal link between the bias subordinate’s discriminatory animus
and adverse employment actions is needed.102 However, it seems that the
circuits in the middle of the spectrum are unable to pinpoint the moment that
employer liability is imputed.103 They also have difficulty finding a broadly
applicable standard. Quite often, it appears that the variations in the factual
scenarios surrounding cat’s paw cases make it very difficult to put a broadly
applicable standard to words. Also, even when a circuit is able to express a
certain standard, there seems to be a virtual certainty another circuit will adopt
some other variation of that causation standard. After recognizing the variance
in the causation standards, the Supreme Court was poised to finally decide the
proper standard in Staub.
II. STAUB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL
As previously mentioned, Staub v. Proctor Hospital is the case of a fired
hospital worker, Vincent Staub, who claimed he lost his job over his service in
the U.S. Army Reserve.104 As a member of the U.S. Army Reserve, Staub was
required to attend occasional weekend training, as well as a two-week training
program during the summer.105 Although employers may not always be
thrilled about the prospect of working around a reservist’s schedule, they must
nonetheless oblige to requirements of the statute without any discriminatory
animus or retaliatory treatment.106 All reservists who meet certain criteria are
protected from discrimination by USERRA.107

99. See id. at 488.
100. See id.
101. Id. As discussed in Part III of this note, the independent investigation defense is perhaps
the only weapon in an employer’s arsenal that can be used to combat a potential cat’s paw claim
if a justifiable adverse employment action was made in the presence of workplace discrimination.
102. Id. at 487.
103. Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 509, 511
(2001).
104. 560 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 2009).
105. Id.
106. This statute is a federal law intended to ensure that persons who serve or have served in
the Armed Forces, Reserves, National Guard or other “uniformed services”: (1) are not
disadvantaged in their civilian careers because of their service; (2) are promptly reemployed in
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In addition to his duties as a reservist, Staub also held a position as a lab
technician in the angiography division at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Illinois.108
Over time, Staub’s relationship with his supervisor, Janice Mulally, became
strained as a result of his military reserve duties.109 Mulally expressed extreme
animosity towards Staub’s service and duties; she even publicly chastised
Staub when he requested weekends off for his mandatory reserve duties.110
Mulally referred to Staub’s duties as reservist “bullshit” and scheduled him to
work during his reservist training.111 She also occasionally made him use
vacation time to attend his training sessions.112 Staub soon contacted Michael
Korenchuk, the department head, and complained of the treatment from
Mulally, but Korenchuk uttered his own animosity towards Staub’s reservist
duties on several occasions.113 Because Staub was one of only two employees
specially trained to work in multiple units at the hospital, Mulally implemented
a policy that Staub was to report to either her or Korenchuk if he had no work
in the angiography division.114
On April 20, 2004, the tension between Staub and his two supervisors
came to a boil.115 After completing his tasks in the angiography division,
Staub attempted to report to Korenchuk before going to lunch, but Korenchuk
was not in his office.116 Staub then left a voicemail on Korenchuk’s phone and
went to lunch.117 When Staub returned to the lab thirty minutes later,
Korenchuk came into the lab and asked Staub to come with him to the office of
Linda Buck, who was the vice president of Human Resources.118
Unbeknownst to Staub, Korenchuk had gone to Buck’s office while Staub was
their civilian jobs upon their return from duty; and (3) are not discriminated against in
employment based on past, present, or future military service. 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2006).
107. Uniform Services includes the Armed Forces, the Army National Guard and the Air
National Guard when engaged in active duty for training, inactive duty training, or full-time
National Guard duty, the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service, and any other
category of persons designated by the President in time of war or national emergency. Id. §
4303(16). In addition, a veteran’s type, job duration, notice, character of service, and a prompt
return to work are also required for coverage under the USERRA. See id.
108. Staub, 560 F.3d at 650–51.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 652.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 651. Much like Mulally’s disdainful comments, Korenchuk’s stated that Staub’s
drill weekends were “a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and [a] waste of taxpayers[‘] money.” Id.
at 652 (citation omitted).
114. Staub, 560 F.3d at 653. This policy was also put in place because of Staub’s alleged
disciplinary problems. See id.
115. Id. at 654.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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at lunch and complained that Staub was once again missing from his
workstation.119 Although it is not clear whether Korenchuk knew about the
voicemail at that time, he did not mention the voicemail to Buck.120 Buck fired
Staub for being absent from his work station.121 Staub filed a suit claiming that
his supervisors were out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military
service.122
In district court, Buck testified that she terminated Staub based on
Korenchuk’s complaint as well as Staub’s questionable employee record and
various employee write-ups.123 Nonetheless, the jury found that Staub was
unlawfully discriminated against in violation of USERRA.124 The Seventh
Circuit reversed, holding for Proctor Hospital that there was no evidence that
Buck relied upon the either Korenchuk’s or Mulally’s anti-military bias.125
The court ruled that the jury could only consider evidence of Korenchuk’ or
Mulally’s discriminatory animus if the court determined that there was
sufficient evidence to support a finding of “singular influence” by Mulally or
Korenchuk over Buck.126 Ultimately, the court found that Buck was not under
the singular influence of any other employee and that she had conducted an
independent review of Staub’s case.127
The “singular influence” standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit can be
characterized as falling closely to the strict “actual decisionmaker” approach.
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis and use of the phrase “singular influence”
paralleled the Fourth Circuit’s actual decisionmaker approach in Hill. Seeing
that another circuit had shifted to a stricter causation standard in favor of
employers, the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in this case.128

119. Id.
120. Staub, 560 F.3d at 654.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 655.
123. Id. at 654. Staub was by no means an ideal employee; he had several disciplinary
actions in his brief employment at the hospital. Id. at 651. It also appears that his communication
skills and abrasive personality seemed to rub many hospital employees the wrong way. Id.
124. Id. at 655.
125. Id. at 659.
126. Staub, 560 F.3d at 658–59. Moreover, the court specifically questioned the evidentiary
requirements under this special theory of liability stating, “[a]llowing the jury to entertain the
cat’s paw theory and decide whether there was singular influence, but only upon a prior
determination that there is sufficient evidence for such a finding, is consistent with Federal Rule
of Evidence 104(b).” Id. at 658. The court concluded that the district court failed to make this
primary determination and found that there existed insufficient evidence of singular influence to
allow evidence of Korenchuk’s and Mulally’s animus to be presented to the jury. Id.
127. Id. at 659.
128. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 130 S. Ct. 2089 (2010).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

632

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI:617

Strangely enough, in his pleadings before the Supreme Court, Staub took
the position that this was not a cat’s paw case.129 Instead, Staub argued that the
cat’s paw theory has no basis in the text of USERRA.130 Staub pointed out that
the word “decisionmaker” is completely absent from the statute.131 Staub
contended that Congress did not intend for the cat’s paw theory to replace
ordinary agency law.132 He also maintained that basic agency principles
should guide employer liability under USERRA.133
In its brief, Proctor Hospital argued that USERRA does contain statutory
authority that supports a departure from agency common law.134 Under the
statute, if any anti-military animus is a motivating factor in an employer’s
decision, then the employer will be held liable.135 Proctor further argued that
even if it is assumed that agency common law principles governed the
discrimination claims under USERRA, agency law requires that the person
who ultimately caused the harm to harbor the discriminatory intent.136 Proctor
contended that under the doctrine of respondent superior, in the context of a
principal/agent relationship, if the agent is not liable, then the principal cannot
be either.137 Proctor claimed that it could not be liable as the principal because
neither Buck, Mulally, nor Korenchuk (its agents) were liable.138 Mulally and
Korenchuk were not liable because Buck’s independent investigation made
their actions not the proximate cause of any harm, and Buck simply held no
discriminatory animus against Staub.139
Proctor Hospital also maintained that the Seventh Circuit’s cat’s paw
analysis (specifically the singular influence approach) is indeed applicable for
USERRA cases.140 In direct contrast to Staub’s argument, Proctor argued that
the text of USERRA itself makes it improper to hold an employer liable for the
discriminatory animus of a biased subordinate who influenced, but did not
make the adverse employment decision.141 Proctor further maintained that
biased subordinates cannot legally cause an adverse employment action if the
ultimate decisionmaker independently reviews the employment action prior to
129. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (No. 09-400).
130. Id. at 35. It’s possible that Staub made this argument because he thought he had a better
chance under an examination of well-established agency principles rather than the newly minted
and judicially problematic cat’s paw theory.
131. Id. at 37.
132. Id. at 36.
133. Id. at 34–39.
134. Brief for Respondent at 54, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (No. 09-400).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 54–55.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 54.
139. Id. at 59–60.
140. Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 12–13.
141. Id.
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a decision.142 Since Buck had conducted her own independent investigation of
Staub’s past conduct and employee records, Proctor was confident that the
causal chain was broken.143 Therefore, even if the Supreme Court ruled
unfavorably on the causation standard, Proctor believed that the independent
investigation was enough to sever the subordinate discriminatory animus.144
Some speculated that the Supreme Court would limit its analysis to agency
principles or to claims strictly arising under USERRA, but it did neither.145 In
an 8-0 decision, with Justices Alito and Thomas concurring in judgment only,
the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision.146 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, states “that if a supervisor performs an act
motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an
adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate
employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”147 As
applied to the facts in Staub, the Supreme Court held there was evidence that
Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s actions were motivated by hostility toward Staub’s
military obligations; and further, since there was also evidence that Mulally
and Korenchuk had allegedly caused Buck to fire Staub, the Seventh Circuit
erred in holding that Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.148
The Supreme Court adopted an extremely lenient, employee-friendly
causation standard in Staub. Without expressly stating it, the Court adopted
the “tainted decision” approach as it declined to separate the internal workings
of employer decisionmaking processes. Instead, the Court insinuated that the
internal processes are nearly inseparable when discriminatory animus appears
at any level.
The majority opinion begins with a discussion of agency principles and
proximate causation.149 It states, “[p]erhaps . . . the discriminatory motive of
one of the employer’s agents (Mulally or Korenchuk) can be aggregated with
the act of another agent (Buck) to impose liability on Proctor.”150 The majority
142. Id. at 39–40.
143. See id. at 46.
144. See id. at 54. The Seventh Circuit noted that an influence cannot be singular if the final
decisionmaker conducted an independent review before taking any action. See Staub v. Proctor
Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009).
145. Allen Smith, Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in ‘Cat’s Paw’ Case, SOC’Y FOR
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/LegalIssues/FederalResources/
Pages/SupremeCatsPaw.aspx. The majority opinion states that the statute is “very similar to Title
VII,” which provides a hint that the cat’s paw analysis in Staub will be fully applicable to claims
arising under Title VII and any other of the federal antidiscrimination statutes that employ the
“motivating factor” language. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011).
146. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1186, 1194.
147. Id. at 1194 (footnote omitted).
148. Id.
149. See id. 1190–92.
150. Id. at 1191.
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opinion goes on to state that both the animus and the action itself can be
attributed to an earlier agent if the adverse action is an intended consequence
of the earlier agent’s conduct.151 The majority sternly rejects Proctor’s
contention that the person who ultimately causes the harm also needs to be the
person to harbor the discriminatory intent.152 The majority states “the exercise
of judgment by the decisionmaker does not prevent the earlier agent’s action
(and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory animus) from being the proximate
cause of the harm.”153
As unexpected as the adoption of a lenient causation standard was, even
more surprising was the majority’s harsh treatment of the independent
investigation defense. It is obvious that the majority has a very pessimistic
view of employers’ independent investigations.154 At first, the Court seems to
reject the defense outright, but the Court merely rejects it as a bright line rule
that holds a claim-preclusive effect.155 The majority opinion states:
Proctor suggests that even if the decisionmaker’s mere exercise of
independent judgment does not suffice to negate the effect of the prior
discrimination, at least the decisionmaker’s independent investigation (and
rejection) of the employee’s allegations of discriminatory animus ought to do
156
so. We decline to adopt such a hard-and-fast rule.

This majority’s lengthy discussion on this tangential topic, however, seems
misplaced. Proctor never advocated that the mere conduction of an
independent investigation defense should be a bright line rule to defeat all
allegations of discriminatory animus. The majority discusses its potential
bright line status because of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.157 However,
the majority mistakenly interprets Justice Alito’s views about the independent
investigation defense. Nowhere in the concurring opinion does Justice Alito
state that merely conducting any type of independent investigation
automatically relieves an employer of liability.158 Justice Alito simply warns
that there are times when a “reasonable investigation” can be conducted to

151. Id. at 1192.
152. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192; contra Brief for Respondent, supra note 134, at 12–13.
153. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192.
154. See id. at 1193.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1195 (Alito, J., concurring). The concurring opinion states that liability should not
be allocated to an employer “where the officer with formal decisionmaking responsibility, having
been alerted to the possibility that adverse information may be tainted, undertakes a reasonable
investigation and finds insufficient evidence to dispute the accuracy of that information.” Id.
158. Id. at 1195–96.
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separate the accurate information from the tainted information.159 The
concurring Justices advocate that the independent investigation defense needs
to remain a tool to shield employers from liability, especially when the facts
indicate that an employee was terminated for reasons unrelated to the alleged
discriminatory animus.160 The majority eventually admits that the independent
investigation is a potential affirmative defense, as it states:
[I]f the employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons
unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action . . . then the employer will
not be liable. But the supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal factor if
the independent investigation takes it into account without determining that the
adverse action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely
161
justified.

Although the preceding statement by the majority carves out room for the
independent investigation defense when it is conducted properly, the majority
strangely continues to berate the defense.162 More specifically, the majority
continues to berate the suggestion that the mere conduction of an independent
investigation has a claim-preclusive effect.163 It is baffling why the majority
dwells on the issue of bright line status when there was simply no suggestion
to begin with. This portion of the opinion certainly seems to contradict the
majority’s previous acceptance of the independent investigation defense.
However, it is important to note that despite the majority opinion’s extreme
skepticism of the independent investigation defense, the defense does remain
available after Staub.
III. THE APPROPRIATE CAUSATION STANDARD AND INDEPENDENT
INVESTIGATION
It is easy to see how a modern employer faces increased uncertainty after
Staub v. Proctor Hopsital. Previously established workplace decisionmaking
protocols may now no longer be in compliance with federal and state
discrimination statutes. For instance, modern corporations often establish
multi-layered managerial structures to ensure that employment decisions are
made efficiently and unbiasedly. However, that same multi-layered structure
may now ironically open up the corporation to liability if a biased employee

159. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1195–96 (Alito, J., concurring). The concurring opinion also differs
from majority in stating that cat’s paw liability doesn’t always exist when the independent
investigation relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor. Id.
160. Id. at 1195.
161. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion).
162. See id.
163. See id.
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even so slightly influences the decisionmaking process.164 After Staub, despite
an employer’s good faith efforts to establish decisionmaker independency, it
appears that disproving a cat’s paw claim will be an uphill battle when some
workplace prejudices may have been present.
Instead of creating greater uncertainty, the Supreme Court should have
adopted a causation standard that would enable employers to effectively
establish a multi-level decisionmaking structure that is capable of making
efficient decisions while carefully shielding off any potential workplace
prejudices. This causation standard would need to be consistent with the
language of a vast array of federal discrimination statutes and at the same time,
be flexible enough to apply to a variety of employment situations. For these
reasons, the Supreme Court should have focused on what is the most important
feature of the causation standard: its ability to function efficiently and
practically for the multitude of employers who are faced with the complexities
of the modern workplace.
The Supreme Court had a number of options from which to try to gauge
this causation standard. For example, it had the option of choosing one of the
two standards at the ends of the causation spectrum, or it could have
implemented a standard from one or more of the middle ground circuits within
the spectrum. Ultimately, the Court chose to adopt a causation standard that is
very much like the tainted decision approach.165 While the extreme standards
at the ends of the spectrum present their own advantages to the modern
workplace, in the long run, the adoption of a standard in the middle of
spectrum would have been the most practical and beneficial to employees and
employers alike.
In addition to embracing a balanced causation standard, the Supreme Court
should also have clearly acknowledged that a properly conducted independent
investigation will relieve an employer of cat’s paw liability.166 Only one
sentence in the majority opinion gave credence to the use of an independent
investigation.167 The Court failed to outline how an employer should conduct
independent investigations, and thus, employers are now left in the dark about
whether their own independent investigations will continue to be effective.

164. Michele J. Gelfand et al., Discrimination In Organizations: An Organizational-Level
Systems Perspective 23–24 (Ctr. for Advanced Human Res. Studies, Cornell Univ., Working
Paper No. 07-08, 2007). The dichotomy between organizational stability and compliance with
federal anti-discrimination regulations often puts employers in a predicament. The cat’s paw
theory is one more thorn in the side of employers who seek to accomplish both efficiently.
165. See supra Part II.
166. MAX MULLER, THE MANAGER’S GUIDE TO HR 189–190 (2009).
167. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193.
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The Functionality of the Staub Standard

The Supreme Court was wise not to adopt the “actual decisionmaker”
approach or another strict causation standard. One can simply look to the
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Staub to see how employers unfairly benefit from
an adoption of this approach.168 Even when a biased employee or employees
may have given some input to the formal decisionmaker, an employer will not
be found liable unless the causal connection was so strong that the biased
employee became the actual decisionmaker.169 Employers would seemingly
have significant leeway in their workplace processes before they would be
faced with cat’s paw liability.
In the long term, the adoption of a strict causation standard would also
have immense implications upon the average workplace environment. Over
the course of time, it is highly likely that employers would recognize their
growing immunity from cat’s paw liability. Employers would begin to realize
that some of their anti-discrimination outlays and preventive programs now
seem to go to waste. They would begin to cut corners and possibly realize that
even the mere appearance of independent decisionmaking could eliminate
potential cat’s paw liability. Employers would become largely indifferent to
their workplace processes because there would be no financial incentive to
improve or even maintain their existing anti-discrimination processes. As part
of a trickledown effect, the formal decisionmakers would subsequently be
content with satisfying the minimum requirements that would ensure a kind of
“independence charade.” The biased subordinates would also likely face fewer
consequences for expressing their workplace prejudices.170 Thus, with the
dwindling threat of liability, the relaxed and content employer could be
inviting a type of discriminatory culture to foster and surface.171
As an illustration of this effect, imagine a potential version of Proctor
Hospital in a world where a strict standard is adopted. Once Proctor Hospital
realizes that it would not be liable for Mullaly’s and Korenchuk’s biases, it has
little financial incentive to prohibit their discriminatory animus in the future.
Buck would have little motivation to discourage the biased behavior because
there would be almost no pressure from hospital administrators to correct it.
Likewise, Mullaly and Korenchuk would have no incentive to change how
they manage their units because their actions are ultimately safeguarded by
Buck’s formal decisionmaking. Suppose a new employee is hired to fill
Staub’s position, and a month after he is hired, he joins the U.S. Army
Reserves. Mullaly and Korenchuk could theoretically continue in their
168. See 560 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir. 2009).
169. See id. at 657.
170. Gelfand et al., supra note 164, at 23.
171. Id. at 14 (“[W]hen management fails to punish discriminatory behaviors, employees may
assume that such discriminatory actions are acceptable, which then perpetuates such acts.”).
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disapproval of military obligations and effectively establish an anti-military
atmosphere.172 Then, once they conveniently have enough evidence of his
subpar work performance, Buck could freely terminate him. While some
might view this as an unlikely and extremely cynical scenario, this glum
outlook could certainly become part of reality. Maybe this would not have
occurred in every company or even in the majority of companies, but
somewhere, on some level, the adoption of a strict causation standard could be
an invitation to an enduring environment of discrimination.
Conversely, the lenient causation standard developed in Staub will
certainly help to improve the multi-layered managerial structures that are the
habitual stage of cat’s paw claims. Obviously, the complexity of modern
companies makes it more efficient and more cost-effective to establish a multiHowever, these structures are also
layer decisionmaking process.173
implemented because they help counteract biases held by individual
employees.174 They provide protection against liability that might result if a
single biased employee was solely making employment decisions.175
Employers establish these multilayered managerial structures partially because
they are an internal check on their own decisionmaking processes.176 As a
result of these internal checks, discriminatory terminations are reduced and
prejudice-based obstacles are removed. Using this logic, the new lenient
causation standard will likely provide additional incentives for employers to
eliminate the power of prejudice in the workplace.
Employers will carefully and rigorously review their internal workplace
decisionmaking processes to ensure that they are able to sift through
managerial prejudices. Formal decisionmakers, managers, and employees
alike would be subjected to higher standards of workplace conduct and review.
Every adverse employment action would be reviewed numerous times, each
with extreme skepticism and concern. Accordingly, an employer’s workplace
culture would become less inhibited by biased subordinates because the
increased attention to unbiased decisionmaking would largely sift out
discriminatory sentiments.
However, while the new lenient causation standard approach has the
potential to reduce discriminatory actions, the adoption of this standard would

172. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1195 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito notes that the
majority’s lenient causation standard may have a similar cultural effect, as he states that the
majority’s stance “may have the perverse effect of discouraging employers from hiring applicants
who are members of the Reserves or the National Guard.” Id. at 1196.
173. Arie Y. Lewin et al., Adaptation and Selection in Strategy and Change: Perspectives on
Strategic Change in Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND
INNOVATION 108, 127 (Marshall Scott Poole & Andrew H. Van de Ven eds., 2004).
174. Gelfand et al., supra note 165, at 13.
175. Id. at 15.
176. Id. at 14.
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also create tremendous burdens on employers. The inherent problem with the
adoption of a lenient causation standard is that it fails to consider the logistical
realities of the workplace.177 It is both procedurally burdensome and
financially impractical. Now, countless man-hours will be spent ensuring that
all employment decisions were void of any discriminatory animus. For a
smaller company, the cost spent shielding itself from cat’s paw liability may
eventually outweigh the pecuniary loss it would have incurred. Additionally,
for larger corporations, there would be an increase in the legal fees that a
company would have to spend defending itself. No matter how carefully an
employer could be in reshaping its workplace processes under such a standard,
the amount of wrongful termination claims will certainly multiply. Companies
will incur considerable time litigating whether any part of a supervisor’s
animus impacted an adverse employment decision. Thus, while this new
lenient causation standard has the potential to remove a considerable amount of
discrimination from the average workplace environment, it will result in too
many impractical obligations and tremendous costs for employers.178
The unfortunate side effects that result from the adoption of a standard at
either end of the spectrum make it apparent that a standard fashioned from the
middle spectrum is the only viable choice. A balanced causation standard
would eliminate several concerns for employers.
First, the financial
expenditures that go to combating workplace biases would be significantly less
under a balanced causation standard than under the lenient standard.
Employers would also not be extensively burdened by the replacement and
review of all their workplace decisionmaking protocols. These reduced
burdens would also occur without long term side effects that would come with
the adoption of a strict causation approach. Employers would not grow
complacent in fighting workplace discrimination, and employees would still be
provided with the protections from superficial decisionmaking processes.
Secondly, the adoption of a balanced approach corresponds with the
Supreme Court’s prior employment discrimination decisions.179 Title VII, for
example, prohibits employers from discriminating against employees “because
of” protected characteristics.180 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit stated that cat’s
paw liability is imputed if the biased subordinate “caused the adverse
employment action.”181 The standards are certainly more analogous to one
177. See Brief of the Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Legal Ctr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 8, Staub, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 09-400).
178. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1196 (Alito, J., concurring). The concurring opinion warns that
“[the majority’s] holding will impose liability unfairly on employers who make every effort to
comply with the law.” Id.
179. See Rachel Santoro, Comment, Narrowing the Cat’s Paw: An Argument for a Uniform
Subordinate Bias Liability Standard, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 823, 831 (2009).
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
181. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006).
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another than either extreme standard. Also, since most circuits had
implemented a balance standard, employers would not have to expend
tremendous time amending their existing protocols. Therefore under a
balanced standard, employers may better structure all of their
antidiscrimination polices, and employees would remain protected under
federal discrimination laws.
B.

The Independent Investigation: The Ace in the Hole

Entirely separate from the causation question, but equally as important, is
how an employer’s independent investigations will hold up after Staub. For a
host of sensible reasons, the independent investigation by the formal
decisionmaker needs to remain a powerful shield for employers in cat’s paw
cases. It is the only viable action available for employers to effectively make
workplace decisions once someone’s bias has reared its ugly head. Workplace
biases, after all, are certain to exist.182 Whether these biases are revealed
through explicit comments or remain entirely undisclosed, eventually, they are
bound to affect even the smallest employer.183 Employers need a mechanism
to sift through these biases. It is the independent investigation that allows the
employer to disregard a supervisor’s discriminatory animus and allow them to
continue (or not continue) with the adverse employment action.
Many recent cat’s paw cases have turned on whether the formal
decisionmaker conducted an independent investigation before the adverse
employment decision was made.184 Every circuit, even those adhering to the
“tainted decision” approach, has held that an employer may escape cat’s paw
liability with an effective independent investigation.185 While the Supreme
Court in Staub viewed the independent investigation defense with skepticism,
it admitted that when conducted properly, it will shield employers from
liability.186 The Court was clear that employers can eliminate liability if an
independent “investigation results in an adverse action for reasons unrelated to
the supervisor’s original biased action.”187 While in BCI, the Tenth Circuit

182. Donna Chrobot-Mason & Marian N. Ruderman, Leadership in a Diverse Workplace, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF WORKPLACE DIVERSITY 100, 104–05 (Margaret S.
Stockdale & Faye J. Crosby eds., 2004).
183. See, e.g., Evangelina Holvino, Bernardo M. Ferdman, & Deborah Merrill-Sands,
Creating and Sustaining Diversity and Inclusion in Organizations: Strategies and Approaches, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF WORKPLACE DIVERSITY, supra note 182, at 245,
tbl.12.4, 266.
184. See BCI, 450 F.3d at 488; Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 560 F.3d 647, 656 (7th Cir. 2009).
185. See, e.g., Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding the causal
link between the discriminatory animus and the termination is broken when the formal
decisionmaker conducts his own independent investigation).
186. See supra note 155 and text accompanying.
187. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (2011).
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stated that independent investigations need not be extensive,188 the Supreme
Court in Staub should have held that a proper investigation should be as
widespread as possible. In fact, the Supreme Court missed a tremendous
opportunity to identify the criteria for conducting effective independent
investigations.
The Supreme Court, at a minimum, should have identified the following as
crucial steps that are inherent for an effective independent investigation: 1)
establish a qualified person to oversee the independent investigation, 2) ensure
that the decision is made upon a careful examination of well-documented
evidence, and 3) conduct truth-seeking interviews with all of the parties
involved.
1. Establishment of a Qualified Person to Oversee the Independent
Investigation
Employers should first choose a qualified person within the company to
independently evaluate the whether an adverse employment action should be
made.189 This qualified person operates under the belief that an employee
should be presumed innocent until proven guilty.190 A qualified independent
decisionmaker also takes precautions to ensure that his biases do not enter the
investigatory process.191 After all, by their nature, biases often operate below
the level of conscious awareness.192 To combat the inadvertent biases, a
qualified formal decisionmaker should cautiously approach every decision as if
there may have been some prejudice hidden during the review.
2. Careful Examination of Well-Documented Evidence
Most importantly, the Supreme Court should have stated that adverse
employment actions need to be based on substantial documented evidence.193
There should be enough documentation that another reasonable person looking

188. BCI, 450 F.3d. at 488 (“Indeed, under our precedent, simply asking an employee for his
version of events may defeat the inference that an employment decision was racially
discriminatory.”).
189. STEPHEN MITCHELL SACK, FROM HIRING TO FIRING: THE LEGAL SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR
EMPLOYERS IN THE ‘90’S 284–85 (1995).
190. LYNNE CURRY-SWANN, MANAGING EQUALLY AND LEGALLY: A PRACTICAL BUSINESS
GUIDE TO PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS AND TERMINATION LAWSUITS 147–48
(1990).
191. DANA M. MUIR, A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW: HOW TO PROTECT
YOUR COMPANY AND YOURSELF 62 (2003).
192. Id.
193. CURRY-SWAN, supra note 190, at 154.
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at the information would also decide to fire the employee.194 The formal
decisionmaker should keep a proper paper trail and remember that the evidence
might eventually be read by the employee, a judge, or a jury.195 By keeping
careful records of negative performance appraisals, the formal decisionmaker
can establish the necessary documentation to ultimately terminate an
underperforming employee.196 Documented records should be reviewed with
caution because they may have been tainted by a biased employee or
supervisor.197 If a biased supervisor created a report or a review, they would
be contaminated with discriminatory animus and should not be relied upon.198
Further, the threat of a lawsuit should not keep the formal decisionmaker from
giving an employee a negative performance review.199 This fear could lead to
evaluating employees under different standards. The independent review,
which is designed to eliminate biases, could then create its own discriminatory
effect.200
3. Conduct Truth-Seeking Interviews With All Parties Involved
Employers should also be conducting truth-seeking interviews as a crucial
step in every independent investigation. Decisionmakers may naturally feel
the need to rely on front-line managers and “to assume they are acting without
a discriminatory motive,” but decisionmakers should “not rely solely on
information provided by the employee’s supervisor.”201 Proper investigations
should include an interview with the affected employee to get his or her side of
the story.202 Other relevant witnesses should be interviewed to gather more

194. Id. at 148. Further, Curry-Swann states that the more severe the discipline, the stronger,
more substantial evidence is required. Id. Therefore, a decision to terminate an employee should
be based upon a vast amount of well-documented evidence. Id.
195. Id. at 155. The formal decisionmaker should review the documentation regularly and
keep it short an sweet to avoid replacing factual assertion with opinion.
196. Id. at 156.
197. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Staub v. Proctor
Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (No. 09-400).
198. CURRY-SWAN, supra note 190, at 142.
199. MUIR, supra note 191, at 64–65. Muir also notes that careful record keeping can make
the difference in a discrimination claim. Id. at 65; see Wilcox v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
253 F.3d 1069, 1070 (8th Cir. 2001).
200. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 199, at 23–24.
201. Angela R. Rogers, What to Do if a Supervisor is Biased: Protecting Your Company from
Cat’s Paw Liability, LAB. & EMP’T UPDATE (Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP), Dec. 2009,
at 3, available at http://www.babc.com/files/Publication/297ff55c-d4c3-4e8b-ba01-0033192415
a3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5ab31ede-42a3-4bbf-9d95-a196b0d411b5/Labor%20
and%20Employment%20News_Dec%202009.pdf.
202. See Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment
by Supervisors, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (last modified Apr. 6, 2010),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html; Tim Davis, Beyond the Cat’s Paw: An
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information and to get third party perspective.203 Only once all the appropriate
parties have been interviewed should the formal decisionmaker then begin to
make conclusions about the accuracy of the evidence. Independent interviews
of all the parties involved shows that the formal decisionmaker’s main concern
is objectivity.204
Some commentators argue that there is too much weight given to
independent investigations because the formal decisionmaker’s true motives
For instance, an
cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty.205
independent formal decisionmaker may not be able to entirely remove himself
or herself from the discriminatory animus because the decisionmaker is too far
removed from employee. If the formal decisionmaker is too far removed from
the employee, he may be more inclined to “credit the views and opinions” of
the biased supervisor than the employee “because of the supervisor’s relative
place in the institutional hierarchy.”206 Further, there may also be situations
where the formal decisionmaker is too closely intertwined with biased
subordinate. The formal decisionmaker’s friendships and allegiances have the
potential to sabotage the independent investigation. There may also be
situations where the formal decisionmakers themselves hold a bias against the
employee.207
Regardless of the criticisms of the independent investigation, one simple
fact remains: There are no viable alternatives to the independent investigation.
Employers need a method by which they may filter through subordinate biases.
Simply because a subordinate may have harbored some bias against an
Argument for Adopting a “Substantially Influences” Standard for Title VII and ADEA Liability, 6
PIERCE L. REV. 247, 260 (2007).
203. Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors, supra note 202.
204. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 197, at 10
(“Simply reviewing evidence compiled by a biased supervisor will not break the chain of
causation between the supervisor’s bias and the ultimate employment action.”); id. at 24 (“The
more thorough and truly independent the investigation, the more likely the employment action
will be the result of the investigation rather than the discriminatory actions of the supervisor.”).
205. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of
Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment
Discrimination Law, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (2001); Joanna L. Grossman, The
Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law,
26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 58 (2003); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Emp. Advisory Council
in Support of Respondent at 21–24, Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (No. 09-400)
(stating that the Equal Employment Advisory Council argues that employer liability in a cat’s
paw case should not hinge on whether an employer conducts an investigation before making an
adverse employment decision).
206. See Sean Ratliff, Independent Investigations: An Inequitable Out for Employers in Cat’s
Paw Cases, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 255, 279 (2009).
207. Dennis Duchon et al., Avoid Decision Making Disaster by Considering Psychological
Bias, REV. BUS., Summer/Fall 1991, at 13, 17 (1991).
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inadequate employee, an employer should not be forever constrained from
terminating that employee if a valid non-discriminatory reason calls for it.
CONCLUSION
Over the past twenty years, the cat’s paw theory of liability has emerged as
one of the most controversial issues in employment law. When the Supreme
Court decided Staub during its last term, it missed an opportunity to clarify
important issues surrounding this complex theory. A more detailed solution
would not only have provided uniformity and assistance to the circuits, but
most importantly, it would have also provided guidance to modern employers.
When it fashioned the appropriate causation standard, the Supreme Court
should have adopted a balanced causation standard in order limit the financial
impact and burden on employers and to encourage the development of an
unbiased workplace environment. Also, instead of largely dismissing the
independent investigation defense, the Supreme Court also should have
validated it and provided employers with the specific elements that encompass
an effective investigation. At a minimum, an effective investigation should
entail the establishment of a qualified person to conduct the investigation, a
review of all the documented evidence, and truth-seeking interviews of all
involved parties. Unfortunately, the Staub decision appears to have ensured
that the cat’s paw theory will continue to perplex courts and the employment
world alike.
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